Can one make the case that social learning is more than an epiphenomenon or individual learning multiplied, that the social aspects of learning are anything more than the kind of secondary help a learner might get from audiovisual displays, bookmarks, and road signs? p. 0

Is it not possible that solo learning is simply a figment of the traditional laboratory-based psychology, on the one hand, and of a socially shared respect for the individual qua individual, on the other? p. 0

A focus on the individual learning in social and cultural solitude is increasingly being seen as conceptually unsatisfying and ecologically deficient. As Bronfenbrenner (1977) has pointed out, “In ecologi- cal research, the principal main effects are likely to be interactions” (p. 518), and these interactions occur, to a large extent, among an individual, his or her social surroundings, and the artifacts culture provides. p. 0

1\vo conceptions oflearning seem to be involved here, each with its own metaphor. On one hand, we have the conception ofthe individual learner, emphasizing the acquisition of knowledge and cognitive skill as transferable commodities (e.g., Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996). On the other hand, we have the sociocultural conception oflearning as a collective participatory process of active knowledge construction emphasizing context, interaction, and situatedness (e.g., Cole & Engestrom, 1993). Thus, one can speak of the “cognitive, acquisition-oriented” conception ofindividual learning versus the “situative, participatory” conception (e.g., Greeno, 1997; Sfard, in press). p. 0

Itisfruitfultoviewtheseconceptionsastwolevelsofanalysis,eachofwhichsometimes neglects the other. p. 0

Something similar might be said oflearning: I t takes place in individuals' minds, and, as we elaborate later, it takes place as a social, participatory process, offering two distinctively different perspectives on learning. While each ofthese perspectives is often treated indepen- dently of the other, our aim here is to examine their interrelationships, not as two separate logical categories but as two perspectives on the phenomena of learning. Thus, while chil- dren often practice arithmetic or climbing trees alone, “individual” learning is rarely truly individual; it almost always entails some social mediation, even i f not immediately apparent Likewise, the learning of social entities (e.g., teams) entails some learning on the part of participating individuals. It is such variations in kind and balance that we mean to examine. p. 0

unifying information-processing perspective on learning within which different views of learning can be described, compared, and contrasted. As used here, the idea of information processing includes no biasing presumptions about where those pro- cesses lie or what entity they serve (e.g., Hutchins, 1996; Perkins, 1993). The information processes in question might occur within the mind of an individual or within complex webs of social interaction. The entity learning might be an indi- vidual or a social entity such as a team, a corporation, a loose group of individuals, or even a society. In any case, information is being processed, and learning and forgetting occur in the sense that lasting changes resulting from the processing- whether “in” the individual or “in” a social entity-can be identified. From the standpoint of information processing, learning for individuals or col- lectives is a considerable challenge. The learning entity in question, whether a person trying to skate better or a loose society of individuals trying to get along with one another, must be able to construct a repertoire of new representations or behaviors based on prior experience. It must have the opportunity to test and select among alternative representations or behaviors, or refine one or combine them. It will need feedback of some sort, from internal or external sources, about how well an alternative fares. It can benefit greatly from information sources-anything from a text to the incidental or deliberate modeling provided by another wiser agent performing the activity in question-as well as guidance through self-regulation or provided by others. To learn, it will need to face an approachable but manageable level of challenge, not too hard to cope with but not so easy as to yield completely to the existing repertoire. The learning entity will also need conditions that sustain motivation and energy. And so on. p. 0

In other words, learning by any entity in any setting has what might be called critical conditions. Such conditions figure not only in the logical story ofhow learning can come about but in the practical story of ensuring that it does come about. Often learning fails not for subtle reasons, such as the learner missing the point, but for gross reasons, such as the lack of a source to provide an important point. With such general challenges in mind, it is useful to speak of a learning system as an information-processing system aimed at facilitating these critical conditions for the learning entity in question. Thus, simple trial-and-error learning of an in- dividual organism through reinforcement is one kind of learning system, with cer- tain ways of dealing with such critical conditions as generating alternatives (by accidentally varying behaviors) and selecting alternatives (through reinforcement). Learning that involves deeper understanding aided by peers in a collaborative setting is yet another kind of learning system, in which alternatives are provided by dif- ferent team members and the selection of the best one is a matter of detailed de- liberations and agreements. p. 0

The ideas of critical conditions for learning, on the one hand, and learning systems designed to facilitate those conditions, on the other, provide a backdrop for addressing the question posed earlier: What are the distinctive meanings of social learning? We distinguishsixmeaningsforthesakeofconceptualclarity.Inlatersections,weelabo- rate further on the first four as more concerned with the dynamics of learning. p. 0

1. Active social mediation ofindividual learning. In human society, one of the p. 0

most fundamentally social forms of learning is that in which a person or a team helps an individual to learn. A teacher teaches reading, writing, and arithmetic; parents correct a child's ungrammatical utterances or misuse of words on the fly; a master takes on apprentices and guides their development; children work to- gether to master algebra problems, each learning from the other. In such cases, the facilitating agent and the primary learner form a joint learning system, the former helping the latter to achieve critical conditions of learning. For instance, the agent may provide information in the form of instruction or demonstrations, informative feedback about what is right or wrong and what to do instead, approachable but challenging tasks, encouragement, scaffolding of the learner's performance as it unfolds with tips and hints, and so on. The exact forms taken by such learning systems vary, of course: A skilled indi- vidual tutor can tune the learning system much more finely to a particular indi- vidual than a classroom teacher can to a room full of individuals (Lepper, Aspinwall, Mumme, & Chabay, 1990; Lepper, Drake, & O'Donnell-Johnson, 1997). A team studying together can elaborate on a member's attempts to solve something the individual could not do on his or her own (Damon, 1984; Slavin, 1994). But such differences aside, the broad idea is the same: to create a better learning system for the primary learner by bringing in a facilitating social agent to help meet the criti- cal conditions of learning. p. 0

Loosely speaking, socially mediated individual learning might be considered the same as instruction, and the point no more than that instruction inevitably in- volves a certain amount of social mediation. But far more is at stake than this. Instruction, in its prototypical forms (involving lecturing or question-and-answer sessions), may be considered a special case-albeit not a very interesting one-of social learning. However, as a learning system, it often does not meet the critical conditions of learning very well. And, when regular instruction is, in fact, effective, the processes involved may not be very socially mediated (as, for instance, when skilled students learn effectively from lectures because of their own autoregulation skills, but rarely from each other). p. 0

2. Socialmediationasparticipatoryknowledgeconstruction.Intheversionofactive social mediation sketched so far, there is a clear distinction between individuals and the learning products they carry away as their transferable cognitive possession, on the one hand, and the social agents facilitating that learning, on the other. But there is a second version of social mediation that deserves recognition: the sociocultural ver- sion, which sees learning less as the socially facilitated acquisition ofknowledge and skill and more as a matter of participation in a social process of knowledge construc- tion (e.g., Cole, 1995; Greeno, 1997). Although the illustrative phenomena are the same-individual tutoring, team problem solving, collaborative and cooperative learn- ing, and so on-the way they are understood in this second version of active social mediation is very different. Social mediation of learning and the individual involved are seen as an integrated and highly situated system in which the interaction serves as the socially shared vehicles of thought. Accordingly, the learning products of this system, jointly constructed as they are, are distributed over the entire social system rather than possessed by the participating individual. p. 0

3. Social mediation by cultural scaffolding. Even when a learner does notre- ceive direct help from another agent actively adjusting to the learner's needs-the first case of social mediation mentioned earlier-the learner may enter into some kind of intellectual partnership or at least be greatly helped by cultural artifacts in the form of tools and information sources. Such artifacts can range from books and videotapes that tacitly embody shared cultural understandings (Perkins, 1986) to statistical tools and socially shared symbol systems embodying, for instance, a “language of thinking” that includes such finely distinguished terms as hypothesis, conjecture, theory, and guess (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991; Tishman & Perkins, 1997). Artifacts are themselves culturally and historically situated, carrying the wisdom and hidden assumptions that went into their design. Thus, they form a learning system with the learner, reorganizing action and determining what can be carried out (along with when, where, in what form, and for what purpose) (e.g., Cole, 1995). p. 0

4. The social entity as a learning system. Another very different meaning of social learning occurs when people speak of learning involving teams, organiza- tions, cultures, or other collectives (e.g., Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schon, 1996; Huber, 1989; Levitt & March, 1988; Senge, 1990). Here it is not necessarily the case that one agent is helping another to learn. Rather, the focus falls on a collec- tive agency that, as a collective, acquires more knowledge, understanding, or skill, or a different climate or culture. A sports team attains patterns of coordination among the individuals that might be quite useless for any of the team members functioning alone. p. 0

5. Learning to be a social/earner. Still another sense of social learning concerns a special case of learning: learning to learn. Contemporary cognitive science rec- ognizes that learning to learn is a fundamental aspect of learning (e.g., Chipman, Segal, & Glaser, 1985; O'Neil & Spielberger, 1979; Perkins, 1995; Pressley & Brainerd, 1985; Segal, Chipman, & Glaser, 1985). Youngsters acquire knowledge, understanding, and skill not only in particular areas (e.g., language use, soccer, or algebra) but about learning itself. For instance, the field of “metamemory” con- cernschildren'sdevelopingunderstandingoftheirownmemoriesandhowtomanage memory (Pressley & Brainerd, 1985). Of course, all of this applies to the learner functioning individually. However, an important dimension of learning to learn involves learning to learn in ways that participate in and capitalize on the social milieu. One simple aspect is learning when and how to ask questions or to ask for help. Another is learning how to enter into reciprocal learning relationships (“I'll help you with this if you help me with that, or we will both help one another with this particularly difficult idea”). Here, the individual learner's learning system p. 0

extends its capacity to deal with the critical conditions of learning by acquiring new ways to capitalize on the social surroundings. p. 0

6. Learning social content. The foregoing categories all concern social factors in the service of learning. Attention to certain of these is the principal purpose of this chapter. Solely for the sake of logical completeness, another possible meaning of social learning needs to be acknowledged: the learning of social content. Social content includes such matters as how to get along with others, how to maintain reasonable assertiveness, how to collaborate in reaching decisions and taking col- lective actions, and so on. This sense of social learning is quite different from those considered previously. To speak of the learning of social content is not to introduce any new way of understanding learning systems, as the other perspectives have done. Here the learning system would be one of those already discussed, operating on social content. p. 0

learning, in contrast with the last two, which deal more with what is learned. The first, social mediation by an active agent (social mediation for short), reflects a range of major figures and lines of inquiry in such areas as cognitive development; tutoring; peer tutoring; collaborative, cooperative, and reciprocal learning; and more. p. 0

The second involves a major stream of contemporary thinking that emphasizes participatory learning and “distributed, situated cognition.” p. 0

The third deals with the mediating role that tools and cultural artifacts, embodying accumulated social wisdom, play in the process of learning. p. 0

And the fourth reflects a tide of interest in team and organizational learning sustained by practical interests in the worlds of business, government, and sports and by the inquiries of psychologists, sociolo- gists, and anthropologists into the workings of collectives of various kinds and sizes. p. 0

The simplest and most familiar modes of social mediation are configurations of one to one (tutor, parent, or teacher to learner), one to many (teacher to a group), and many to one (a pair, trio, or other group of collaborative learners with the learner as a participant). In all of these cases, the interactions between the learner and the “other(s)” are expected, and often found, to enhance the individual's learn- ing. Two distinguishable entities are involved in the learning system: the learner and the “other,” entities sometimes in complementary relations (as, for example, when a knowledgeable adult tutors a remedial student) (Lepper et al., 1990, 1997) and sometimes in more symmetrical relations (as, for example, when classroom p. 0

peers work well together, each facilitating the individual learning of the other) (Slavin, 1994). p. 0

Whether di- rectly inspired by Vygotskian thinking or by more current constructivist sources, social “scaffolding” (Scardamalia, Bereiter, McLean, Swallow, & Woodruff, 1989) entails two critical processes: internalization and active construction of knowledge in the form of active solutions to problems or formulation of designs, with the help ofexplicit guidance, modeling, encouragement, mirroring, and feedback (e.g., Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Perkins, 1991; Slavin, 1994). p. 0

The importance of active, constructive participation is underscored by an inter- esting difference between tutoring and peer problem solving. Whereas adult tutors aim to facilitate the learning of their tutees, peers working together often aim sim- ply to accomplish the task. Consequently, the individual learner often has more of a chance to participate actively in critical planning and decision making when interacting with an expert tutor than with peers (Rogoff, 1991). This highlights an important aspect of social mediation of individuals' learning: Mediation is effec- tive not necessarily as a function of simple “internalization, with modeled informa- tion being transferred across a barrier from a social partner to the inside of a child, or with information being transmitted” (Rogoff, 1991, p. 362). Rather, mediation is effective through active participation whereby learners “transform their under- standing and skill in solving the problem” (Rogoff, 1991, p. 362). Thus, according to this view, it is active construction that is so crucial to learning, not some social guidance going underground. It becomes clear why social learning and a constructivist approach to learning have become close allies (Resnick, 1991). p. 0

There are further characteristics that distinguish socially mediated learning from relatively solitary learning to the advantage of the former. One such condition involves the “objectivization” of one's thoughts, still-to-be-formulated ideas, and considerations, which, when communicated and shared, can be discussed, exam- ined, and elaborated upon as if they were external objects. Objectivization of this sort is quite impossible outside the social context. Slavin (1994) pointed to two additional conditions necessary for social mediation to be effective: shared group goals and personal accountability. In his review of the research literature, he found that, in their absence, no significant enhancement of learning takes place; members of the learning system may work in incongruent directions and may not expend the needed mental effort (for other factors that debilitate social facilitation, see O'Donnell & O'Kelly, 1994; Salomon & Globerson, 1987). p. 0

Social Mediation as Participatory Knowledge Construction The account of social mediation reviewed so far has two features that some would view with suspicion. First, the notion that cognitive processes can be so- cially mediated suggests that these same processes, under the right conditions, might proceed without such mediation. Second, by and large the focus has fallen on the learner's learning, without a recognition that the facilitating social agent also may learn. p. 0

These concerns have led to a different conceptualization of social mediation influenced by the more qualitative, holistic way of anthropological thinking; the neo-Vygotskian sociocultural school of thought; and a sharp critique of typical laboratory learning studies as too removed from the social context of real life. Especially motivating are systematic findings about the nonsystematicity ofhuman performance, so highly dependent on particular cultural and social situations (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991 ). Such factors led to the development of a new paradigm for the study of learning in social contexts (e.g., Lave, 1988; Resnick, 1991; Wertsch, Del Rio, & Alvarez, 1995). According to Wertsch (1991), the basic assumption of this sociocultural paradigm is as follows: Human mental functioning is inherently situated in social interactional, cultural, institutional, and historical context. Such a tenet contrasts with approaches that assume, implicitly or explicitly, that it is possible to examine mental processes such as thinking or memory independently of the sociocultural setting in which individuals and groups function. (p. 86) p. 0

According to Sfard (in press), “the identity of an individual…is a function of her being (or becoming) a part of a greater entity. Thus, talk about stand-alone learner and decontextualized learning becomes as pointless as the attempts to define lungs and muscles without a reference to the living body within which they both exist and function.” p. 0

Despite these contrasts with the social mediation ofindividual learning, the notion of learning systems as information-processing systems that must meet critical conditions of information provision, feedback, and so on still makes sense. How- ever, the description of a learning system changes. Knowledge, rather than being transmitted or internalized, becomes jointly constructed (“appropriated”) in the sense that it is neither handed down ready-made nor constructed by individuals on their own. Rather, knowledge, understandings, and meanings gradually emerge through interaction and become distributed among those interacting rather than individually constructed or possessed (Pea, 1993). And if knowledge is distributed among participants in a specific activity context, it is necessarily situated as well (Greeno, 1997), that is, intimately welded to the context and the activity in which and by means of which it is constructed. Therefore, participation becomes the key concept (as contrasted with acquisition and conceptual change) serving as both the process and the goal of learning (Sfard, in press). p. 0

Greeno (1997) asks whether we should “consider the major goals and outcomes of learning primarily as collections of sub-skills or as successful participation in socially organized activity and the development of students' identities as learners” (p. 9). The answer to this question from a sociocultural point of view clearly favors the latter: The nameofthegameisparticipation,anditstandsinstarkcontrasttothedecontextualizable cognitive attainments of the individual (Cole, 1991; Sfard, in press), as often-and, apparently, incorrectly-attributed to Piaget (Louren~o & Machado, 1996). Whereas accounts of learning offered from Piagetian or traditional information-processing perspectives emphasize individuals' (solo) knowledge construction, often facilitated by social scaffolding, the socioculturally inspired account emphasizes the socially based participatory construction of knowledge. And whereas the former views learn- ing and knowledge as pertaining mainly to individuals' transferable cognitive attain- ments, the latter sees learning more as a highly situated activity of participation (cf. Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996; Greeno, 1997). p. 0

The role of tools and symbol systems as both reflecting and affecting the human psyche has long been recognized. But scholarly attention has focused on tools as social mediators of learning mainly as a result of the Russian sociocultural tradi- tion of Vygotsky (e.g., 1978), Luria (1981), and Leont'ev (1981), along with their Western interpreters (e.g., Cole & Wertsch, 1996). Here we use “tools” in a broad sense, including not only physical implements but technical procedures (e.g., the algorithms of arithmetic) and symbolic resources (e.g., those of natural languages and mathematical and musical notation). p. 0

A system formed by a person or persons using tools is not usually first and foremost a learning system. It is a system for doing something else, accomplishing some task like digging a ditch or having a conversation across an ocean. Nonethe- less, any such system is secondarily a learning system, and at two levels. Hutchins (1996) points out how the conduct of an activity also characteristically involves development of the practitioners and development of the practice. The combina- tion of persons and tools creates a new cognitive entity with an enriched cultural legacy and extended capabilities. The person may learn to use the tool more effec- tively, the tool and the objects to which it is applied thereby supplying information and feedback to that end, providing important conditions of learning, and helping to teach the user about a better way of accomplishing the task through the tool. Moreover, some tools mediate learning about a wide array of other matters. They may do so simply as information sources, as in the case of books or films, func- tioning as vehicles for symbolic communications. But more than that, they may do p. 0

so as implements of information handling, as with a student's notebook and pencil (or, today, laptop computer), a flexible platform for organizing ideas expressed in the symbolic tools of text, formula, and diagram. Tools characteristically play a double role: as means to act upon the world and as cognitive scaffolds that facilitate such action. Some tools not only enrich one's cognition but actually transform it. Memory is just not the same once certain lan- guage structures and writing have been acquired. The same applies to acquired ways of reasoning and to socially shared theories that constrain, color, and direct one's thinking and interpretation (e.g., Wertsch et al., 1995). For example, statis- tical tools are said to have become psychological models for the interpretation of human conduct (e.g., the analysis of variance model serving to explain human interaction) (Gigerenzer, 1991). p. 0

The cognitive transformations triggered by tools have two sides. One side is learning effects with the tool. This recognizes the changed functioning and ex- panded capability that takes place as the user uses and becomes accustomed to particular tools. Impact occurs through the redistribution of a task's cognitive load between persons and devices (e.g., Pea, 1993; Perkins, 1993), including symbol-handling devices (e.g., a spell check), or across persons, mediated by devices and symbol systems (telephones, fax machines). As these examples suggest, such tools are all around us, but their possibility also invites the design of special-purpose tools for supporting various cognitive functions. For instance, experiments have shown that a computerized “reading partner” that provides ongoing metacognitive-like guidance improves students' comprehension oftexts while they read with the tool (Salomon, Globerson, & Guterman, 1989). In addition to effects with, there are effects ofthe tool. This concerns the more lasting ripple effects of using the tool beyond actual occasions of use: the impact on one's cognitive arsenal of skills, perspectives, and ways of representing the world (Salomon, Perkins, & Globerson, 1991). Thus, for example, computer-based learning environments offer students “problem spaces” in which they can work through their understandings of challenging concepts (Perkins & Unger, 1994). Students who read texts with the reading partner just mentioned have been shown to become better readers of novel, print-based texts and also better essay writers, apparently as a result of having learned to be more self-regulating (following the tool's model). p. 0

The contrast between ofand with effects parallels, in some ways, the contrast be- tween a cognitive, acquisition-oriented view oflearning and a situative, participatory view. The acquisition stance emphasizes how tools can affect cognition in a relatively lasting and generalizable way even when people function in their absence. Thus, for example, Scribner and Cole (1981) studied the cognitive effects of literacy without schooling in the African tribe ofthe Vai, and Salomon (1994) studied the way in which elements of media symbol systems can become cognitive tools. On the other hand, as Olson, Torrance, and Hildyard (1985) have argued with respect to literacy, “It is misleading to think of literacy in terms of consequences. What matters is what people do with literacy, not what literacy does to people” (p. 15). p. 0

As to what is learned, Huber (1989) suggests that learning consists in knowl- edge, in a broad sense, acquired by any unit of an organization and available for acting upon. Superior learning lies in knowledge more widely distributed across units, with common rather than disparate interpretations. Huber, following Morgan and Ramirez (1983), writes of such knowledge as “holographic,” in that each unit carries at least a rough picture of the whole. p. 0

One broad systemic characteristic amplifies many of these problems: Organiza- tional learning systems tend to take the “low road” (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Learning occurs without any “high road” mindfulness or reflective abstraction. p. 0

Hutchins (1996) characterizes a great deal of organizational learning as more like a blind evolutionary process than deliberate design. This low road rather than high road character of organizational learning should not come as a surprise. After all, first and foremost organizations are performance systems, not learning systems. p. 0

Individual learning is most sensibly viewed not as learning utterly naked of social contexts, influences, and participations but as learning in which the factors discussed earlier have relatively lesser rather than greater presence. p. 0

Bereiter (1997; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989) argues that some learners take the opportunity to engage in more intentional and deeper learning, above and beyond the affordances of the social situation and what it calls for. p. 0

To sharpen the idea, let us trace a couple of these spiral reciprocities. A student experiencing difficulties with mathematics may benefit from joint problem-solving sessions with a group of peers (active social mediation of learning), with student and peers reaching, through negotiations, several understandings concerning the way they want to proceed (the social entity learning to function), which leads to a certain division of labor concerning homework to be done by each member (but with mediation by cultural artifacts such as textbooks). The student then returns the next day to the group of peers to compare notes with his or her partners and to jointly solve new and more demanding problems (further active social mediation of a different sort, with the team members having progressed in their math under- standing). In other words, the student learns through different learning systems with vary- ing degrees of social mediation and collectivity at different moments, with their characteristic ways of providing information, generating feedback, and so forth. p. 0

think that the argument made by Damon (1991) applies here as well. Although, according to the sociocultural, participatory view, the different components of the learning system may not exist without each other (Cobb, 1997), which is the es- sence of being a fully integrated social system, we believe that each still retains its separate identity and attributes as an individual, as a team, or as a tool. p. 0

Another implication of the discussion is that good learning, whether individual or collective, depends greatly on self-mediation or mediation by other agents; in other words, it depends on high road (intentional, conceptually oriented) rather than low road (practice and automaticity-oriented) learning (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Typi- cal school settings do not offer nearly the opportunities they might for the develop- ment o f self-regulated, high road learning p. 0

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